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ARE OLIVER STONE AND TOM CLANCY
JOURNALISTS? DETERMINING WHO HAS STANDING
TO CLAIM THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
Kraig L. Baker
Abstract: Most circuits recognize a qualified privilege that provides a partial First
Amendment shield for journalists to protect the confidentiality of their sources and materials.
Few courts, however, discuss the scope of the class protected by this privilege. This
Comment examines who has traditionally been part of the protected class and explores the
trends and concerns of courts in granting standing. This Comment also recommends a
framework that courts can use to determine whether to extend the journalist's privilege to new
formats of communication and applies this framework to two examples.
Journalists have long claimed a privilege under the First
Amendment's freedom of the press provision that protects the
confidentiality of their sources and research materials.' They argue that
confidential sources and materials are essential to successful
investigative reporting and contribute to the free flow of information that
lies at the heart of the freedom of the press provision.2 Conversely,
testifying in criminal and civil trials has traditionally been an obligation
of citizenship and integral to serving the public interest.3 First
Amendment values, therefore, may conflict with the public interest in
effective law enforcement and guaranteeing a fair trial in which all
relevant evidence is presented.
The past thirty years have produced vehement conflicts between these
competing interests. Seldom does a month go by without a journalist
confronting efforts to force disclosure of confidential sources.4 The
courts have attempted to solve this problem by developing a qualified
privilege that provides journalists with a partial First Amendment shield
1. Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes,
and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 815,816 (1984).
2. Glenn A. Browne, Note, Just Between You and Me... For Now: Reexamining a Qualified
Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury Proceedings, 1988 U. ill. L.
Rev. 739,739 (1988).
3. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
280(1919).
4. In December 1993, an Anchorage Daily News reporter faced repeated efforts to force
disclosure of her source of internal corporate documents. David Whitney, Alyeska, Hamel, Fail to
Settle Case, Anchorage Daily News, Dec. 11, 1993, at Al. In April 1993, a reporter in Florida was
jailed for thirty days for refusing to disclose a source. Owen Thomas, Notes on the Media, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Apr. 6, 1993, at 13.
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from compelled disclosure of confidential sources and materials.
Legislatures have attempted to provide protection to journalists by
enacting state statutes dubbed "press shield" laws. These resolutions,
however, have often been incomplete and inadequate.
There is little case law that discusses who, leyond the traditional
media, is covered by journalist's privilege.' Historically, nearly all
claims involved members of the traditional print and broadcast media. A
recent Ninth Circuit case, however, granted the privilege to an
investigative book author.6 Determining exactly who is entitled to the
privilege will be particularly important as technology provides additional
tools and techniques to improve information flow7 and trends in the
media suggest a blurring of the traditional lines between news and
entertainment.
This Comment examines the evolution of the class protected by
journalist's privilege. Part I provides a doctrinal and historical analysis
of journalist's privilege. Part II examines who is currently entitled to
protection and the courts' concerns about expanding this protection. Part
III advocates that all circuits adopt the von Bulow test and reject adding a
public interest requirement to standing analysis. It also recommends
how courts should respond to authors of small circulation, private
newsletters and creators of fictional works who claim the privilege.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
Journalists have long claimed a privilege to protect the confidentiality
of sources. In 1722, Benjamin Franklin's half-brother was brought
before a committee of the legislature and told to reveal the name of an
author of a story in his newspaper. When he refused, he was imprisoned
for a month.9 Until the 1960s, relatively few courts considered whether a
5. For the purposes of this Comment, the traditional media includes newspapers, magazines,
television, radio, and wire services.
6. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit rejected an academic
researcher's right to claim the journalist's privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Scarce, 5 F.3d
397 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Scarce v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994). This is not within
the scope of this Comment.
7. Examples include electronic mail, on-line services such as Prodigy or Westlaw; and 24-hour
news networks such as CNN or C-Span. For an argument why electronic on-line services deserve
freedom of the press protections, see Tung Yin, Comment, Post-Modern Printing Presses: Extending
Freedom of the Press to Protect Electronic Information Services, 8:2 High Tech. L. J. 311 (1993).
8. This trend is exemplified by the rise of tabloid journalism such as A Current Affair and Hard
Copy and "reality" programming such as COPS and Rescue 911.
9. Marcus, supra note 1, at 817.
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constitutional privilege protected journalists who refused to reveal their
sources. Following a number of confrontations between the press and
the government, the United States Supreme Court rejected an absolute
privilege in 1972 in Branzburg v. Hayes.'0 Since this decision, most
courts have recognized a qualified privilege that provides a partial First
Amendment shield from compelled disclosure of journalists' confidential
sources and materials." Courts typically engage in two separate analyses
to determine when a journalist is protected. First, the courts will decide
if the journalist has standing to claim the privilege. Second, the courts
will balance the interest in freedom of the press against the need for
disclosure, and then determine where the paramount interest lies.
A. The Need for a Journalist's Privilege
There are two competing interests at issue in deciding the existence
and extent of a journalist's privilege. The preservation of the free flow
of information has long been recognized as a core objective of the First
Amendment. The First Amendment also rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the public's welfare. 3 There is,
therefore, a paramount public interest in maintaining a "vigorous,
aggressive and independent press." 4 Courts recognize that this public
interest is threatened by compelled testimony of journalists because of
the likely deterrent effect on future undercover investigative reporting. 5
Additionally, courts are concerned that shielding information will
prevent parties in litigation from receiving a fair trial. In civil trials, pre-
trial discovery is treated liberally.'6 If no privilege applies,"' a person
can be compelled to produce any relevant evidence or any information
10. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
11. The circuits do not define the privilege uniformly. Although the journalist's privilege
definition varies among the circuits, the differences do not significantly affect the subject of this
Comment.
12. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
13. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969).
14. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
15. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
16. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
17. Recognized privileges vary from state to state, but at least protect marital communications,
communications between client and lawyer, confidential information secured in the course of the
physician-patient relationship, and governmental secrets. John W. Strong et al., McCormick on
Evidence § 72-113 (4th ed. 1992).
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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."8
This broad right of discovery is based on the principle that litigants have
a right to every person's evidence and that this wide access advances the
integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for
the truth. 9 In criminal trials, courts are even more concerned about the
paramount public interest in effective law enforcement and a defendant's
right to a fair trial.
Despite these competing interests and the long history of journalists
claiming a privilege, 0 few cases addressed the privilege's existence until
the late 1950s.2 Two factors contributed to this. Fist, reporters seldom
demanded a hearing, and many cases went unreported because courts
dealt leniently with reporters who violated court orders to disclose
informants' identities.' Second, to maintain a good working relationship
with the press, the federal government often limited its efforts to obtain
journalists' confidential information and sources.'
Journalists initially relied on the common law to argue that a privilege
existed that protected confidential sources.24 They contended that the
public's interest in the unrestricted flow of information justified the
recognition of a common law privilege. Courts rejected this argument
and ruled that a reporter's confidential communications were not
privileged from disclosure,25 because the harm to the fair adjudication of
litigation would outweigh the uncertain improvement to the free flow of
information.26
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
19. United States -s. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
20. The first reported case was Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375)
(jailing a reporter for contempt of Congress for sending a copy of a proposed treaty to end the
Mexican-American War to his editor).
21. Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and
Private Litigation, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 1198, 1200 n.9 (1970).
22. Id. at 1201 n. 11 and accompanying text. The punishment dealt to reporters for refusing to
disclose information was mild compared to the damage journalists felt that disclosure of confidential
sources would cause. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729 (Or.), cert. denied, Buchanan v.
Oregon, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (fining a reporter $300).
23. Comment, supra note 21, at 1201. When the government needed confidential information
from the press, it usually entered into negotiations with the party from whom the information was
sought in order to reach a compromise.
24. Craig A. Newman, Qualified Privilege for Journalists Branzburg v. Hayes: A Decade Later,
61 U. Det. L. Rev. 463, 464 (1984).
25. Id. at 465.
26. Marcus, supra note 1, at 818-19.
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Having failed to persuade courts to grant protection under the
common law, reporters asked state legislatures to enact "press shield"
laws. These shield laws created a reporter's right to protect confidential
sources and research materials. Although a significant number of states
have enacted such legislation,27 journalists have found that these shield
laws do not provide adequate protections. The shield laws are not
uniform, which creates problems for national publications. They are also
narrowly written with respect to both the scope of the privilege and the
scope of the protected class.28 For instance, the California press shield
law limits protections to the sources of "persons connected with or
employed by or any person who has been so connected or employed by"
newspapers, magazines, press associations, wire services, and other
periodical publications.29 Finally, courts have construed these statutes
narrowly.
30
Garland v. Torre,31 decided in 1958, was the first case to recognize
that compelled disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources could
abridge the First Amendment's guarantee of press freedom.32 Over the
next decade, several cases endorsed the Garland recognition of a First
Amendment privilege." The majority of courts, however, still refused to
grant reporters a privilege in any form.34
During the 1960s, the number of subpoenas for journalists'
confidential sources rose dramatically as a result of the Nixon
Administration's attempts to undermine leftist, radical activity. 35 The
27. Twenty-eight states have enacted press shield laws. Jonathan Groner, Media Push Broader
Protection; ACLU Says D.C. Bill Shields Press Too Much, Legal Times, Dec. 2, 1991, at 6. Courts
in ten other states have found a privilege in the common law or the state constitution. Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 975 (1988).
28. People v. LeGrand, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (rejecting a book author's claim
of privilege under the New York press shield law); see also Matera v. Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Because the protected class in shield laws is drawn narrowly, shield laws do
not significantly impact this Comment.
29. Cal. Evid. Code §1070(a) (West 1994 Pocket Part).
30. Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24
UCLA L. Rev. 160, 169 (1976). Courts have held reporters to the strict letter of the law. They have
not used legislative intent to correct ambiguities or mistakes in the shield law's wording. Id.
31. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
32. Id. at 548.
33. Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 901
(1971); People v. Dohrn, Order No. 69-3808, Cook Co., Ill., Cir. Ct. Crim. Div. (1970).
34. In re Goodfader, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961); State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729 (Or.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); State v. Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. 1971).
35. Comment, supra note 30, at 162-63 nn.13, 15, 20. The first sign of the growing use of
subpoenas was in the Chicago Seven trial. The government served subpoenas on all four major
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government alleged that the press was sympathetic to leftist
organizations and, thus, often had information unobtainable by the
government. 6 The rise in subpoenas met with strong opposition from
the media, and an unprecedented number of journalists began claiming
that a constitutional privilege protected them from compelled disclosure
of information.37 The Justice Department tried to quell the complaints of
journalists by issuing "Guidelines for Subpoenas of the News Media."
These guidelines encouraged Justice Department lawyers to negotiate
with reporters and to issue subpoenas only as a last resort.38  Despite the
guidelines, federal law enforcement officials continued to subpoena
journalists to testify and to reveal unpublished inforiation.39
B. Branzburg v. Hayes Rejects an Absolute Privilege But Recognizes
the Potential for a Qualified Privilege
The United States Supreme Court's seminal ruling on the protection of
journalist's confidential sources came in a group of four consolidated
cases titled Branzburg v. Hayes.40 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected a
special First Amendment privilege for the press but recognized that a
qualified privilege would exist in certain circumstances. The first three
cases involved reporters whose motions to quash4" had been denied by
Chicago daily newspapers, the three major television networks, and Newsweek; Time, and Life
magazines. Thereafter, reporters faced subpoenas in almost every trial brought against leftists.
These included the trials of members of Students for a Democratic Society, Angela Davis, and
Bobby Scale.
36. Id. at 163. Before the Nixon administration began to investigate militant left-wing activists,
there had rarely been a problem. Usually the Justice Department wanted information on Klan-type
elements. The press had little sympathy for these groups so the information was passed on in a
casual, amiable spirit. This changed after Vice-President Agnew's attacks on the press and Attorney
General John Mitchell's strong prosecutions of left-wing militants wlo many reporters felt were
justified in some of their militancy.
37. John E. Osbom, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updaling the Empirical Evidence
After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 57, 62 n.24 (1985) (noting that between
1968 and 1981 eighty cases arose involving a reporter's claim of privilege); Cf. Comment, supra
note 21, at 1200 n.9. (noting that between 1911 and 1968 there were only seventeen reported cases
involving reporter's privilege).
38. Newman, supra note 24, at 469-70 (quoting Department of Justice, Memo No. 692 (Sept. 2,
1970)).
39. Id.
40. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
41. A motion to quash is one that is brought to annul or make void an indictment or subpoena.
Black's Law Dictionary 1245 (6th ed. 1979).
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the highest state courts in Kentucky and Massachusetts.42 These courts
rejected the reporters' assertions that they could refuse to appear before
grand juries. The courts found that the grand jury investigations were
proper, and that any adverse effect on the free dissemination of news
caused by the reporters' appearances was indirect, theoretical, and
uncertain.43 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Caldwell,
granted a reporter's motion to quash.' The Ninth Circuit said that First
Amendment protections existed to maintain communication with
dissenting groups and to provide the public with a wide range of
information about the nature of protest.45 The court concluded that the
First Amendment required that the press enjoy a constitutional privilege
to decline to appear before a grand jury investigating dissenting groups.
Otherwise, the public's First Amendment right to be informed would be
jeopardized. 4' The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
this conflict.
Justice White, writing for a plurality, rejected the assertion that the
press deserved a privilege to withhold confidential information. He
noted that, historically, the grand jury had a right to every person's
evidence,47 and a reporter owed the same responsibility as any other
citizen to a grand jury. He further held that the public interest in
effective law enforcement and efficient grand jury proceedings was
sufficient to override the burden on newsgathering that would result from
compelling reporters to respond to relevant questions in a valid grand
jury investigation.48  Justice White was also skeptical about the
contention that the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news
would be undermined if the Court rejected a journalist's privilege. He
noted that the press had operated without constitutional protection for
their informants since the country's inception. This had not inhibited the
development or retention of confidential news sources.49
42. Branzburg 408 U.S. at 669-70,674.
43. Id. at 674.
44. Id. at 675, 677.
45. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
46. Id. at 1089.
47. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
48. Id. at 690-91.
49. Id. at 698-99.
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Finally, the plurality stated that, unlike the dissent, s° it was unwilling
to recognize a privilege whose administration would present significant
practical and conceptual difficulties."t Every time a reporter resisted a
subpoena, the court would have to make preliminary factual and legal
determinations as to whether the proper predicate had been laid for the
subpoena. 2 The court would also have to evaluate the importance of
different laws when considering whether enforcemernt of a particular law
served a compelling government interest. 3 Finally, it would be
necessary to define those categories of newsgatherers who qualified for
the privilege. The plurality considered this a questionable exercise in
light of the traditional doctrine that the liberty of the press is the right of
the lonely pamphleteer just as much as the large metropolitan publisher.54
Branzburg, however, was not a total loss for the press. The Court
recognized for the first time that newsgathering was protected by the
First Amendment. 5 In addition, Justice Powell stated, in a concurrence,
that the Court did not hold that journalists subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury were without any constitutional right to safeguard their
sources.5 6 He recognized that a motion to quash should be granted if a
reporter is required to provide information that bears only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation or if the reporter
has some other reason to believe that the compelled testimony implicates
a confidential source relationship without advancing a legitimate need of
law enforcement.57 Justice Powell also asserted that claims of privilege
should be determined case by case by balancing the freedom of the press
against the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony about
criminal conduct." Justice Powell further clarified his limited view of
50. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent would have held that a reporter's sources
would remain confidential unless the government could demonstrate a compelling interest in the
information. It would have required the government to: (1) show that there is probable cause to
believe that the journalist has information that is clearly relevant to a specific, probable violation of
the law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in
the information.
51. Id. at 703-04.
52. Id. at 705.
53. Id. at 705-06.
54. Id. at 704.
55. Id. at 681.
56. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 710.
58. Id.
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Branzburg in a dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post.5 9 He wrote that a
fair reading of the plurality's analysis in Branzburg made plain that its
outcome hinged on a balancing of the competing societal interests in the
case and not on any determination that First Amendment protections did
not exist.6
C. Growth of the Qualified Privilege
The holding in Branzburg caused confusion among commentators and
judges alike. Four justices concluded that reporters could be compelled
to disclose their sources; four justices said they could not be so
compelled; and Justice Powell took a middle position by allowing
compelled disclosure in some circumstances but not in others. This left
the lower courts to decide whether a privilege existed in those situations
that went beyond the Branzburg facts.
Immediately following Branzburg, many judges and commentators
felt that a journalist's privilege had been completely rejected.61 In fact,
in the first cases after Branzburg, both federal and state judges denied
any First Amendment privilege of confidentiality for press defendants.62
A reading of the cases since the Court's decision, however, makes
reasonably certain the conclusion that Justice Powell's concurrence is the
controlling opinion of the case. 3 Based on this concurrence, every
circuit but one that has ruled on the issue has adopted a qualified
privilege that requires a case-by-case balancing of interests.
4
59. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 859-60.
61. Marcus, supra note 1, at 839. Many states responded to the holding of Branzburg by enacting
or strengthening existing "press shield" laws. Id. at 859-60. There was also a movement in the U.S.
Congress to enact a national "press shield" law. Id. at 860.
62. See Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975);
Lightman v. State, 294 A.2d 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re
Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (NJ.), cert. denied, N.Y. Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); In re
Bridge 295 A.2d 3 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973). But see
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Bursey v.
United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
63. Marcus, supra note 1, at 836.
64. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980);
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); La Rouche v.
Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F. 2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d
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Farr v. Pitchess65 was the first case to recognize formally a qualified
privilege. Farr asserted that Branzburg identified a limited or conditional
First Amendment protection of news sources.' Farr then formulated a
test to determine whether the requested testimony or material was within
the privilege. The court stated that the claimed First Amendment
privilege and the opposing need for disclosure should be considered in
light of the surrounding facts and a balance should be struck in favor of
the more compelling interest.67 Other circuits adopting a qualified
privilege have also construed Branzburg as advocating a case-by-case
balancing of interests. Almost every circuit has adopted the following
three-part test: (1) whether the information is relevant, (2) whether the
information can be obtained by alternative means, and (3) whether there
is a compelling interest in obtaining the information. 8 Most courts also
recognize that there is little reason for drawing a formal distinction
between the standards of review for civil ard criminal cases.
69
Therefore, courts have used this three-part test, or some variation, for
both civil and criminal cases.
II. DEFINING THE PROTECTED CLASS
Part of the plurality's reason for rejecting the privilege in Branzburg
was a concern that defining the protected class wculd present practical
and conceptual difficulties.7" Justice White felt that almost all authors
could assert that they were providing information to the public and that
705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Only the Sixth Circuit has explicitly rejected the privilege. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Storer Communications, Inc., 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987). The Seventh
and the Eleventh Circuits have not ruled on the issue.
65. 522 F.2d 464. The Eighth Circuit, in Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 992-93, was the first circuit to
suggest that prior cases did not absolutely reject a testimonial privilege for journalists, although it
fell short of recognizing a formal privilege. The court felt that to routinrly grant motions compelling
reporter's testimony would deter the free flow of news from confidential sources.
66. Farr, 522 F.2d at 467.
67. Id. at 468.
68. La Rouche, 780 F.2d at 1139. This test is refined from one originally articulated in Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
69. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983). There is a marked difference,
however, between the way the interests are balanced in these cases. In criminal cases, courts nearly
always view the public's interest in effective law enforcement and in guaranteeing defendants a fair
trial as compelling. In contrast, courts in civil cases often find for the journalist. Courts conclude
that compulsory process should not automatically prevail over the competing First Amendment
interests because the reporter's interest is public while the civil litigant:; is predominantly private.
70. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,703-04 (1972).
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they relied on confidential sources who would be silenced if the authors
were compelled to disclose information to a grand jury.7 He was also
worried that some criminals might set up "sham" newspapers in order to
claim the privilege and, thereby, insulate themselves from grand jury
inquiry.72
Contrary to the plurality's concern, courts have rarely been forced to
define categories of journalists who have standing to assert the privilege.
Most claims have involved the institutional press, whose membership in
the protected class is simple to determine. In von Bulow v. von Bulow,
the Second Circuit designed a test to determine who, beyond the
institutional press, belongs to the protected class.73 The von Bulow test,
also adopted by the Ninth Circuit,74 defines a member of the protected
class as anyone who, at the inception of the newsgathering process, had
the intent to disseminate information to the public. If the intent is
present, the method of dissemination is irrelevant as long as it serves as a
vehicle for information and opinion.75
Courts have specifically acknowledged the rights of the institutional
print and broadcast media,76 documentary filmmakers,77 authors of
technical publications," and professional investigative book authors79 to
claim the journalist's privilege. Authors are not protected, however,
71. Id. at 705.
72. Id. at 705 nA0.
73. 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
74. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 1293.
76. See supra note 64.
77. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Co., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (reversing a district court's
conclusion that the claimant was not a newsperson because he did not regularly engage in obtaining,
writing, reviewing, editing or otherwise preparing the news).
78. Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (protection for technical
publications is included within the scope of journalist's privilege because the traditional doctrine of
freedom of the press is the right of all types of reporters).
79. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing a district court order denying a
professional investigative book author standing to claim journalist's privilege.); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987) (denying standing to a
novice unpublished book author who did not have the intent to disseminate at the inception of the
news gathering process); State v. Fontanille, No. 93-KH-935, 1994 WL 25830 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 24,
1994) (finding an investigative book author constitutionally entitled to the journalist's qualified
testimonial privilege).
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when, by their own actions, they become investigative arms of the state"0
or when the issues of the case involve questions about the truth of factual
assertions contained in their books.8" The courts have not ruled on non-
investigative book authors. Some cases have held book authors
ineligible to claim protection under "press shield" laws. These cases
raise arguments that could impact book authors' eligibility for the
journalist's privilege.82
In addition to meeting the von Bulow test, the courts' analysis of
claims ofjournalist's privilege appear to contain three common elements.
First, the courts seem to require that the class in question serves a public
interest. Second, they balance the law's traditionally narrow view of
privileges and the need to expand the protected class in order to maintain
consistency in applying the journalist's privilege. Finally, the courts'
determinations are often driven by the unique facts of each case.
A. The "Public Interest" Requirement
Case law suggests that for standing to be grarited, a claimant must
demonstrate a public interest in the general subject matter of a work.
The earliest appearance of this requirement was in Apicella v. McNeil
Laboratories.3 The Medical Letter, the publication at issue in Apicella,
reported on the properties, effectiveness, and adverse effects of various
drugs. In order to accomplish this, the publishers employed doctors as
confidential consultants to evaluate the drugs. The defendant attempted
to depose these consultants, but The Medical Letter refused to disclose
their names.84 The court upheld the publication's refusal, finding that the
80. Farber v. Job, 467 F. Supp. 163 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that auhor was not eligible to claim
journalist's privilege when, by his own actions, he had become an investigative arm of the state and
the only reason he was withholding his confidential sources was to make a "bigger splash" with his
book).
8 1. In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Gronowicz v.
United States, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) (holding that author would not be protected by the privilege
when the issues of the case involved questions about the truth or falsity of factual assertions
contained within the book).
82. See, e.g., People v. LeGrand, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). (concluding that an
author's interest in protecting confidential information was less compelling than that of a journalist)
To report the news and remain valuable to the public, professional journalists must constantly
cultivate sources of information. Journalists must also maintain their credibility and trustworthiness
as repositories of confidential information. Most authors, in contrast, are independent contractors
whose success invariably depends more on the researching of public and private documents, than on
confidential rapport with sources of information.
83. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
84. Id. at 80.
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newsletter, with a circulation of 70,000, performed a public and
professional service by providing information on various drugs.85 The
court felt that free communication in the area of health, just as in politics,
should be encouraged and that this could best be accomplished by
providing technical journals the same privileges afforded to other
publications.86 Apicella, therefore, implies that there must be a public
interest in the content of the material.
This public interest requirement was reinforced in Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee.87 In Silkwood, the defendant subpoenaed a third party's research
for a documentary film.8" The court upheld the filmmaker's right to have
the subpoena quashed because of the underlying public interest in
documentary filmmaking and, particularly, in affording it the same
protections as other publications that communicate information to the
public. 9
Although Silkwood and Apicella preceded the von Bulow test, a more
recent case, Shoen v. Shoen, ° also suggests that a public or professional
function is necessary. In Shoen, the court subpoenaed an investigative
book author's research in a defamation action.91 The court upheld the
author's right to have the subpoena quashed. The court noted that the
journalist's privilege was designed to protect investigative reporting,
regardless of the medium used to report the news to the public. It further
recognized that investigative book authors have historically played a
vital role in bringing to light newsworthy facts on topical and
controversial matters of great public importance.9' The court held that
because these authors performed an important public service, they
deserved the same protections as conventional journalists. Thus, the
emphasis on public or professional service remains essential in defining
the scope of the journalist's privilege.
85. Id. at 85.
86. d
87. 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
88. Id. at 434.
89. Id. at 436-37.
90. 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 1291.
92. Id. at 1293. The court cited the works of Rachel Carson, The Silent Spring (1962); Jessica
Mitford, The American Way Of Death (1963) and The American Way Of Birth (1992); Ralph Nader,
Unsafe At Any Speed (1965); Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (1906); and Lincoln Steffens, The Shame
Of The Cities (1904).
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B. Balancing the Courts' Narrow View ofPrivilege and the Trend to
Expand the Protected Class.
Courts have historically been cautious about privileges, because
privileges contravene a fundamental principle of our judicial system that
the public has a right to every person's evidence.93 As such, exceptions
are not lightly created nor expansively construed.94  Evidentiary
limitations are properly recognized only to the extent that such privileges
promote a public good that transcends the normally predominant
principle of using all rational means for finding the truth.95
By definition, any expansion of the protected cless will provide more
exceptions to the public's right to evidence and compromise the fair and
complete adjudication of matters. One seeking to expand a privilege,
therefore, must demonstrate an individual or public interest substantial
enough to outweigh the interest in having access to all information
necessary for a fair trial. In many cases, freedom of the press and the
public's right of access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other
ideas will meet this burden.96
Despite the courts' reluctance to expand privileges, the general trend
has been to expand the class of those who have standing to claim the
journalist's privilege. The "press" includes a wide variety of
communication formats. As the Supreme Court said in Lovell v. City of
Griffin, "[T]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals.... The press in its historic connotatio:a comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."
97
The journalist's privilege, therefore, has not been limited to institutional
or traditional types of media, but includes other forms that contribute to
the free flow of information to the public. 98
Furthermore, the courts have expanded the class in order to be fair and
consistent in applying the privilege.99  Information that would be
protected if gathered and published in a newspaper has also been
protected if communicated to the public in another way."°° Journalism
93. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
94. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974).
95. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
96. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
97. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
98. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Co., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977); von Bulow v. von Bulow,
811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
99. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
100. Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 FR.D. 78, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293.
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must be defined by its content, not its form. This makes sense because it
would be unthinkable to have a rule that an investigative journalist, such
as Bob Woodward, would be protected by the privilege in his capacity as
a newspaper reporter writing about Watergate, but not as the author of
All the President's Men.1'
C. Courts'Determinations Are Fact Driven
Courts have considered the facts of each case when determining
whether a claimant has standing to claim the journalist's privilege. This
is illustrated by contrasting the results of von Bulow0 2and Shoen °3. The
identical test was used to determine standing in both cases."
Nevertheless, the courts rejected the privilege for the author in von
Bulow but granted it in Shoen.
Von Bulow grew out of civil litigation between Claus von Bulow and
the children of his wife, Martha von Bulow. Andrea Reynolds, a third-
party witness, appealed a contempt order that directed her to produce
certain materials relevant to the litigation, including the manuscript of an
unpublished book she had written. Reynolds, an intimate friend of Claus
von Bulow, claimed that the manuscript was protected by the journalist's
privilege. To support her claim, she asserted that she was a writer for the
German magazine, Stern, showed a press pass issued by the New York
Post, and produced a telex indicating that her final manuscript would be
serialized by a German publishing agency.' During her deposition,
however, Reynolds stated that she had never published anything under
her own name and that the manuscript had not been prepared under
contract.'06
In Shoen, author Ronald Watkins became involved in a defamation
action because of his work on a non-fiction book about the long and
bitter feud over control of the U-Haul company." 7 This feud pitted
Leonard Shoen against two of his sons, Mark and Edward. Following
the murder of the wife of a third son, Leonard Schoen made statements to
the national press implying that his sons were involved in the killing.
101. Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293.
102. 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
103. 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 1293; von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144.
105. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 137-39.
106. Id. at 139-40.
107. 5 F.3dat 1290.
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Mark and Edward Schoen subsequently filed a defamation action.
Meanwhile, Watkins secured a contract with a major publisher to write a
book about the Shoen family. Leonard Shoen agreed to cooperate with
Watkins by providing source material for the book. Mark and Edward
Schoen then subpoenaed Watkins's tapes and notes for the defamation
action." 8
The differences between the cases demonstrate why one court granted
standing to Watkins, while another denied it to Reynolds. Watkins was a
professional author with previous book credits and had a contract with a
publisher to produce the book in question."° In court, Watldns claimed
only the journalist's privilege,"0 and he had only a professional
relationship with the Shoens."' In contrast, Reynolds' manuscript had
been rejected by publishers, and she had never published anything under
her own name."' She claimed not only journalist's privilege, but also
scholar's privilege, attorney-client privilege, and "any other privilege
that exists under the sun.""' 3 Finally, Reynolds was romantically
involved with Claus von Bulow. 4  This comparison suggests that a
professional who has an affiliation with a legitimate medium and who
appears to be sincere about the claim of privilege is more likely to be
granted standing. If the person claiming the privilege appears to claim it
solely to prevent the production of documents or to refuse to testify,
standing should be rejected.
It appears that when determining standing, cou.ts will consider the
sincerity of the claimant as well as whether the public's interest in the
content outweighs the need to construe privileges narrowly. These
factors will be considered in addition to the requirements of the von
Bulow test. The public interest in the content of a work or in an
individual publication, however, should not be considered in
determinations of standing. Instead, it should be weighed when
examining whether the public interest in maintaining a fair trial
outweighs the burden on the press." 5
108. Id. at 1290-91.
109. Id. at 1290.
110. Id. at 1291.
111. Id. at 1290-91.
112. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 139-40. Novice and free-lance writers are eligible for the privilege,
but must clearly show that the author's intent was to disseminate the news to the public.
113. Id. at 139.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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III. A PROPOSED TEST TO EVALUATE CLAIMANTS OF THE
JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE AND HOW IT WOULD APPLY
TO TWO EXAMPLES
The von Bulow test should be adopted by all circuits to determine
whether an individual or group has standing to claim the journalist's
privilege. Currently, both the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit use
the von Bulow test. It defines the protected class as anyone who has the
intent to use material sought, gathered, or received to disseminate
information to the public and had that intent at the inception of the
newsgathering process." ' The test should be adopted for three reasons.
First, the von Bulow test should be adopted because it is consistent
with the goals and concerns that underlie the journalist's privilege. Since
the test emphasizes the intent behind the newsgathering process and not
the mode of dissemination, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's
recognition that the press includes all publications that contribute to the
free flow of information." 7 The test is also consistent with the courts'
concerns that the privilege apply only to legitimate members of the press.
The test does not grant standing to any person with a manuscript or film,
but requires an intent to disseminate news to the public at the inception
of the newsgathering process. Therefore, the privilege is available only
to persons whose purposes are those traditionally inherent in the press.
Second, the von Bulow test should be adopted because it can apply to
new ways of communicating information. For a test to be useful, it must
be flexible enough for courts to apply it effectively to both the traditional
media and new communication formats. The von Bulow test satisfies this
requirement because it emphasizes the existence and timing of the
author's intent, not the method of dissemination. Finally, the test should
be adopted because the Second and Ninth Circuits are experts in this area
because most of the publishing and media industries are located within
their boundaries. As a result, they have more experience in adjudicating
disputes involving the media.
What follows is a demonstration of how the von Bulow test would
apply to two groups that are likely claimants. These groups are
particularly intriguing, because an analysis of their claims raises issues of
whether different standards should be applied to public and private
speech and whether the privilege is designed to protect fiction as well as
fact. The best approach for courts to take is to grant standing to authors
116. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144.
117. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
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of small circulation newsletters and reject standing for creators of
fictional works.
A. Authors of Small Circulation Private Newsletters Should Have
Standing To Assert the Journalist's Privilege
The first potential class includes the editors, publishers and
contributors of small circulation private newsletters. These publications
are designed to reach a discrete audience, typically members of a club,
workplace, or organization. Authors or publishers of these newsletters
may claim the journalist's privilege in a number of situations. In
criminal cases, newsletters may print information that would be relevant
to law enforcement officials pursuing or prosecuting; a crime. The most
likely examples would be newsletters published by white supremacists or
computer users. For instance, a white supremacist newsletter could print
an article about a hate crime that included information unknown to law
enforcement. Similarly, a newsletter for computer users could print
information regarding illegal accessing of databases. These differ from
"sham" newsletters, because they do not exist for an illegal purpose.
In civil actions, a claim of the journalist's privilege may arise from
allegations that a newsletter printed libelous statements or material that
demonstrated that the newsletter had information relevant to ongoing
litigation. For instance, a newsletter's coverage of power struggles for
leadership of an organization could lead to allegations of libel, or a
published interview could refer to unpublished information that parties
would like to acquire in discovery.
The question of standing for authors of these publications arises,
because small circulation newsletters arguably fail to meet the "intent to
disseminate to the public""' clause of the von Bulow test. Although they
disseminate information, the newsletters are available only to a discrete
audience determined by membership or employment. These newsletters
are not in libraries, nor are they readily available to the general public in
any other way." 9
These newsletters are similar to the publications that worried Justice
White in Branzburg. He was afraid that groups might set up newspapers
in order to engage in criminal activity and then claim the journalist's
118. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144.
119. Large circulation newsletters, such as publications from profesmional associations or public
interest groups, will have few problems gaining standing because their hlrge circulation blurs the line
between their membership and the public. Their publications are also usually available to the public.
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privilege to insulate themselves from grand jury inquiry. Justice White
said one might expect that "sham" newspapers would be easily
distinguishable from legitimate ones. He said, however, that the First
Amendment normally prohibits courts from inquiring into the content of
expression and thus protects publications regardless of their motivation,
orthodoxy, timeliness, or taste. 20
The courts will probably treat this question on a case-by-case basis.
Precedent suggests that courts will grant the privilege in most cases and
will base this decision on the holding of Lovell.12 ' Lovell held that,
historically, the press included all methods of communication that
provided a vehicle for information or opinion. The language from Lovell
has been cited to extend standing to documentary filmmakers, publishers
of technical journals, and investigative book authors, and was important
in formulating the von Bulow test."
Courts will probably not grant the privilege to all newsletters. Some
courts may reject standing because a newsletter's circulation is too small
to reach the "public." Other courts may adopt the reasoning of Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders" and reject standing to claim the
privilege, because the subject matter of the newsletter does not involve
matters of public or general interest. In Dun & Bradstreet, a plurality
suggested that libel protections for journalists extended only to
defamatory statements involving a matter of public or general interest.'24
Although this limitation has not been formally adopted as part of the
journalist's privilege analysis, the public interest requirement in Apicella,
Silkwood, and Schoen suggests that some courts may adopt Dun &
Bradstreet as part of the test." The newsletters that will most likely fail
to qualify will be published by extremist or counterculture groups,
because their speech is traditionally disfavored by the majority and,
therefore, may not serve a general or public interest.
120. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972). Although Justice White's concerns were
directly related to the use of "sham" newspapers to escape the grand jury, they apply to all criminal
and civil cases because of the courts' general concerns about the right to a fair trial.
121. 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a quotation of the
language.
122. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Co., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977); Apicella v. McNeil Lab.,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
123. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
124. Id. at 755 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,44 (1971)).
125. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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A better reasoned approach would be to recognize the right of all
those affiliated with private newsletters to claim journalist's privilege.
Denying standing to those affiliated with a private newsletter because its
circulation is too small and doesn't reach the public contradicts the way
courts have previously defined "public." The cour's have not insisted
that "dissemination to the public" means "dissemination to everyone."' 26
In fact, the courts haven't even required "dissemination to the public" to
mean complete public access to the publication. 27 For instance, courts
have granted the privilege to small circulation newspapers.'28
The audiences of private newsletters are also no more discrete than
street comer pamphleteers, whom the courts have protected. Branzburg
stated that the right of the "lonely pamphleteer" is equal to that of the
"large metropolitan publisher." '29 Lovell said that the press "necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets."'"3  The pamphleteer might be
distinguished by some, because the audience is limited to who walks by
and not to who joins the organization. This argument is unpersuasive.
Like any organ of communication, a pamphlet's dissemination is defined
by who elects to take, purchase, or view it. Furthermore, pamphleteers
may self-select their audience and only offer the publication to members
of a certain ethnic group or gender. Pamphleteers also self-select the
audience based on where they stand. For instance, a pamphleteer would
reach a significantly different audience distributing material in a
suburban shopping mall than at a downtown bus stop. It would be
awkward for courts to protect a pamphleteer, whose means of production
and dissemination result in a small circulation and discrete audience,
while denying protection to those affiliated with a. private newsletter.
The differences between the audiences are slight and should not be
grounds for disqualifying newsletters.
The courts should not reject claims based on the failure of a newsletter
to be in the public or general interest. As Justice 3rennan said, courts
should not have the power to decide what speech is of public concern.'
Even if the courts require that publications perform some public
126. This seems obvious. Not everyone sees a newspaper or owns a television.
127. Many magazines or newspapers are unaffordable to indigent persons. Similarly, many
publications or programs are only available at a regional level.
128. See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting the journalist's
privilege to a law student writing for his law school newspaper).
129. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
130. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
131. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 785 n.ll (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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function, every private newsletter can arguably meet this threshold.
Employee newsletters maintain employee morale and lead to increased
productivity."' Organizational or commercial newsletters enhance the
expertise of their members and lead to heightened aesthetics, innovation,
or economic success. 33 Even newsletters of extremist or counterculture
groups serve the public interest by adding to the "marketplace of ideas"
and the nation's diversity.'34
Second, denying standing to some private newsletters would
complicate the tests for determining whether to grant the journalist's
privilege and, therefore, unnecessarily burden the judiciary. Currently,
the application of journalist's privilege involves a threshold
determination of standing using the von Bulow test. This is followed by
a balancing of the competing interests of freedom of the press against the
right to a fair trial to determine where the paramount interest lies. If
courts denied standing to some authors and publishers of private
newsletters because the newsletters' circulations were too small or
because they failed to perform a public function, courts would be forced
to draw a line based on the publication as well as on the intent of the
individual author. This would require a third test to be met before a
claim of journalist's privilege could be resolved. In stark contrast
reporters from a newspaper or television station would only have to
prove the intent to disseminate their individual work, not the legitimacy
of their organizations.
This third test would require findings of fact regarding whether the
newsletter performed a public function or whether its circulation was
large enough to constitute dissemination to the public. At the very least,
it would require additional briefing and affidavits and probably the
presentation of witnesses in a hearing. This would burden tight judicial
calendars and overused courtrooms.
These added burdens are unnecessary. Because the journalist's
privilege is a qualified rather than an absolute privilege, courts can factor
in the public or general interest of a newsletter when examining whether
132. Considerable literature exists that discusses the important role newsletters play in
maintaining effective communication in the workplace and high employee morale. See, e.g., Robert
C. Ford and Pamela L. Perrewe, After the Layoff. Closing the Barn Door Before All the Horses Are
Gone, Business Horizons, July-Aug. 1993, at 34-41; Robert Liparulo, Iron out Morale Problems,
Real Estate Today, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 18-23; Martha Ray, The New Way to Boost Morale: Keep
Your Staff Informed, Working Woman, July 1991, at 16-18
133. See, e.g., In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting Standard & Poor's
the journalist privilege for their commercial periodicals).
134. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the public interest in maintaining a fair trial outweighs the burden on the
press. Thus, the courts do not have to make these determinations during
the standing analysis. Contrary to Justice White's fears, sham
newsletters will not be protected by the journalist's privilege, because
they will always fail the balancing test.
Finally, denying the privilege to small circulation private newsletters
would unfairly burden the small press and inhibit the expression of
alternative views. Defining "dissemination to the public" or "public
function" as including a circulation requirement or a narrow
interpretation of what constitutes the public would stifle alternative
views and unpopular speech. It would be a manifestation of the tyranny
of the majority to say that publications with large circulations are, by
definition, "public" or serving a "public function" while forcing small
circulation newsletters to prove their public function. To deny the
journalist's privilege to small newsletters would create problems of
inequality and would deny some citizens access to communication that
reflects their views.
B. Creators of Fictional Works Should Not Have Standing To Assert
the Journalist's Privilege
Creators of fictional works also could attempt to claim standing for
journalist's privilege. The potential class includes, but is not limited to,
novelists, dramatists, filmmakers, artists, and television producers.
Specifically, the increasing number of television movies that are "based
on a true story,"' 35 the recent play based on the Thomas-Hill hearings,'
the movie JFK,37 and the best-selling novels of Tom Clancy,3 ' are
examples of fictional works whose background research could have
uncovered information relevant to litigation or law enforcement
investigations and could have inspired claims that the creators'
informative function was close enough to a journalist's to be eligible for
the journalist's privilege.
The situation most likely to involve a claim of journalist's privilege
would almost parallel the facts in von Bulow or Sill.-ood. A researcher
135. Examples would include the recent television movies on Amy Fisher, the David Koresh
incident in Waco, and the inevitable movies about Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan.
136. Marne Hunt, Unquestioned Integrity: The Hill-Thomas Hearing.
137. (Warner Bros. 1992) (about the assassination of John F. Kennedy).
138. E.g., The Hunt for Red October (Berkley Books 1984); Patriot Games (G.P. Putnam's Sons
1987); Red Storm Rising(Berkley Books 1986).
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investigates a controversial issue and intends to produce a work for
public dissemination. While doing this research, the researcher uncovers
information relevant to parties in litigation or law enforcement. The only
difference from von Bulow or Silkwood is that in the hypothetical the
researcher intends to create a fictional work to entertain the public rather
than a non-fiction work to inform the public.
There is little in the case law to indicate how courts would rule on this
issue. Justice White asserted in Branzburg that the informative function
of the organized press is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. He felt that almost any
author could accurately assert that the author was contributing to the
flow of information to the public and that the author relied on
confidential sources of information who would be silenced if the author
were forced to make disclosures before a grand jury. 139 Although this
language seems dispositive, Justice White did not argue that these classes
should have standing to claim the journalist's privilege. Instead, he
argued that an absolute journalist's privilege should be rejected on the
ground that the potential class of persons claiming the privilege would be
too large. Since Branzburg, however, courts have cited this language to
show that Branzburg upheld Lovell and that protection from disclosure
may be sought by those not associated with the institutionalized press.' 40
No court has held that all of the classes mentioned by White should be
eligible for the privilege.'
4
'
The language that most clearly implies that creators of fictional works
should be eligible to claim journalist's privilege is found in Shoen. The
majority noted that investigative book authors historically played a vital
role in uncovering information on matters of great public importance.' 42
An example cited by the court is Upton Sinclair and his novel, The
Jungle. '3 It is unclear whether the inclusion of this fictional work
among a list otherwise consisting of non-fiction examples was intended
to extend standing to creators of fictional works.
139. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,702 (1972).
140. von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987);
Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
141. To this point, none of the classes cited by Justice White, except academic researchers, have
asserted a right to a privilege. Academic researchers do not claim standing to assert journalist's
privilege, but claim an analogous privilege.
142. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
143. Id. The book exposed the horrors of the Chicago meat-packing industry. It led to almost
immediate reform in pure-food legislation. Ronald Gottesman, Introduction to Upton Sinclair, The
Jungle, at xxiii-xxiv (Penguin Books 1965) (1906).
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The circuits may split on this issue. The Second and Ninth circuits
would be the most likely to extend the privilege to creators of fictional
works given the historical expansiveness with which they have viewed
the privilege and their experience and sensitivity in adjudicating disputes
involving the media. Although other circuits may look to the Second and
Ninth circuits for guidance in determining the appropriate test, they may
not look to them for help in applying the test or balancing the competing
interests. Other circuits may determine that the need to view privileges
narrowly and the need to avoid placing additioaal burdens on the
judiciary outweigh the public interest in protecting creative artists, who
they may not view as fulfilling the public service of providing news to
the public.
Courts should uniformly reject the standing of creative authors to
claim the journalist's privilege because such authors do not primarily
gather news. A creative author's primary goal is to provide
entertainment, not to disseminate information. An artist will view facts
selectively, change the emphasis or chronology of events, or fill in
factual gaps. In contrast, a journalist is interested primarily in informing
the public. Journalists are expected to report information fully and
accurately and will be taken to task if they don't.1"
Even when creative authors gather news, they fail the von Bulow test
because they lack the intent to disseminate information to the public at
the beginning of the research process. Creators of fictional works intend
at the beginning of the information gathering process to create a piece of
art or entertainment. Any intent to disseminate factual information
discovered during this process is peripheral to that goal. This is very
different from authors of non-fiction works or members of the
institutional press, whose intent from the outset is to disseminate
information to the public. Even if a creator of a fictional work intends at
the outset to disseminate information to the public, there is still a
question of credibility. The public does not rely on fictional works for
factual information, nor does it refer to these works as sources for
scholarship. Therefore, a person who claims to have chosen fiction as a
medium for disseminating news to the public must and will be viewed
with skepticism.
It can be argued that the journalist's privilege should extend to those
who use fiction as a tool to inspire the public or whose fiction is based on
144. In 1981, Janet Cooke of the Washington Post was widely criticized, lost herjob, and gave up
her Pulitzer Prize when she admitted that her feature profile about an 8-year old heroin addict was
faked. Ask the Globe, Boston Globe, Apr. 22, 1993, at 62.
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underlying truth. While this type of art should be encouraged, it should
not receive protection under the journalist's privilege. First, the von
Bulow test applies only to informing the public, not inspiring the
public.' 45 More importantly, granting standing to creators of fictional
works would further blur the lines between truth and fiction and erode
public confidence in the standards of journalism.'46 The journalist's
privilege is a means to assist the public in receiving news and finding
truth. 47 Standing to claim the journalist's privilege should be denied to
any group that would undermine these values.
Even if granting creative artists standing to claim the journalist's
privilege would have positive value for those works based on underlying
truth, the resulting administrative burdens on the courts and law
enforcement would outweigh those benefits. To properly determine
whether a creator of a fictional work had standing, courts would be
forced to expend judicial resources determining whether a work imparted
enough information to the public to be considered "disseminating news."
In addition, uncertainty about whether parts of a work would lead to
important information or were merely fictional enhancements would lead
courts and law enforcement on wild goose chases and cause them to
expend further resources. Finally, courts would be required to inquire
into the accuracy of facts in order to determine which information was
true and which information had been altered, added to, or created to
enhance the story. This would put courts in the uncomfortable position
of making judgments on the public interest and social value of various
claimants' art. Considering the questionable newsgathering function
performed by creative artists, courts should find these concerns
dispositive and reject the standing of creative artists to claim the
journalist's privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most courts recognize a qualified privilege for journalists that
provides a partial First Amendment shield from compelled disclosure of
confidential sources and materials. This privilege should apply to more
than just members of the traditional press. Some courts have adopted the
von Bulow test to provide a mechanism for determining membership in
the protected class. This test should be adopted by all circuits because
145. von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
146. Telephone Interview with Robb London, New York Times (Mar. 17, 1994)
147. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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the test would provide uniformity, is consistent with the goals of
journalist's privilege, and is flexible enough to apply to new ways of
communicating information. The courts should reject, however, attempts
to add a public interest requirement when determining standing, because
public interest will be considered when balancing the freedom of the
press and the need to guarantee a fair trial. In addition, the general trend
of courts has been to expand the class eligible to claim the privilege.
This expansion should continue, including recognition of standing for
persons connected to small circulations and private newsletters, because
a wide variety of persons and communication formats contribute to the
free flow of information to the public. This expansion should not include
creators of fictional works, however, because creators of fictional works
do not gather or disseminate news and there is a fundamentally different
intent behind the creation of their work.
